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rN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRENT "W" BROWN, * 
PETITION FOR 
Plaintiff/Appellant, * WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
vs. * 
Court of Appeals Case No, 
GERALDINE K. BROWN, * 890293-CA 
Defendant/Respondent. * 
QUESTION FOR REVIEW 
Defendant/Respondent, Geraldine K. Brown, by and thiouyh 
counsel hereby petitions the I'tah Supreme Court for a Writ; of 
Certiorari to review the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, the Honorable Judges Bench, Davidson, and Ormer 
entered on or about August 31, 1990. Defendant requests this 
Court to review the following issue? 
1. Is the Utah Court of Appeals Order vacating the 
trial court's award of attorney's Eees and failing to award 
attorney fees on appeal in conflict with prior decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Court of Appeals, the generally 
sanctioned rule of law, and the Panel's own guidelines in 
light of the numerous other cases regarding award of attorney 
fees in divorce actions. 
REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals was 
issued on or about August 31, 19^0. A copy thereof is 
included in the appendix. Dei^nd.int only se^ks this C'ouit's 
levi^w of I he Court of App^aln tuJInq on attoiney feon, both 
at ti iaJ and on appeal. 
JUR1SI) F CT 1 0HA1, STATFJMENT 
The Order and Judgment which modified a 1986 Decree of 
Divorce previously entered was signed and entered by the First 
Disttict Coutl, tlif3 Honorable VeNoy Chr i s tof f ersen , on Api i I 
7, 1989. The Notice of Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
was filed May 4, 1989. The HI ah Court of Appeals issued its 
opinion on August 31, 1990. Ho rehearing has been requested. 
This Coin t has jurisdiction to j^view the decision in question 
by Wilt of Certiorari by virtue of HIP Constitution of Utah, 
Article 8, Section 1, et s e c , 78-?-! <*i . sec. Utah Codo 
Annotated 1953 as amended, and Rules 45 and 46 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The controlling statute in this action, Section }0~3-3, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. This section provides 
as follows: "The C o m c may order either party to pay . . . a 
sum of money . . . to enable such party to prosecute oi del end 
[a divorce or modification] action." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an action filed by Defendant, Geraldine K. 
Brown, to modify a Decree of Divorce, requesting an increase 
in child support and alimony as well as requesting attorney's 
fees for bringing this matter to court. Although technically 
a modification action, in reality the Court was requested to 
establish reasonable child support and alimony based on 
Plaintiff's historical and then current income due to the fact 
the Plaintiff was temporarily unemployed at the time of the 
original divorce hearing. Plaintiff had been re-employed 
earning a substantial income when the Petition to Modify was 
filed. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Decree of Divorce was entered in the above-en LiUed 
matter on or about March 28, _1986. (Record Volume I ("R-l") 
p. 50) 
Defendant filed her Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce 
on or about December 14, 1987. (R-I p. 87) 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents 
were issued to Plaintiff on or about January 8, 1988. 
(R-l p. 106) 
On or about August 31, 1988, the January 8, 1988 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents still 
having not been answered, Defendant again filed a Second 
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Motion to Compel Discovery. (R-L pp. 133-138) Defendant had 
filed numerous objections to PLaintiff's requests for 
extension of time. 
Plaintiff's then acting attorney, J.yJe W. HilLyard 
HJhLYARD, ANDERSON f* OLSEN, filed a withdrawal of counsel on 
OJ about September 2, 1988. (R-L p. 140) 
On or about September 20, 1988, the Court granted 
Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery, allowing 10 day^ to 
comply with the discovery order and further ordered that 
Attorney HiJlyard's withdiawal would not be recognized until a 
notice in writing was furnished to the Court from Plaintiff 
personally indicating that Piamtjff had terminated the 
attorney-client relationship. (R-f p. 142) No written 
notices were ever provided by Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's trial attorney, Richard B. Johnson, entered 
his appearance on or about September 29, 1988. (R-J p. 145) 
Partial Answers to Defendant's First Set of 
interrogatories and Responses to Defendant's Requests for 
Production of Documents were issued on or about October 3, 
1988. (R-i pp. 147-227) 
Defendant issued a Notice of Readiness for Trial on or 
about October 11, 1988. (R~l p. 278) 
On or about October 25, L988, a hearing on the Petition 
was set for January 17, 1989. (R~I p. 230) 
On or about November 8, 1988, Defendant again filed a 
Motion to Compel Discovery (actually the third such formal 
motion) requesting the Court to order Plaintiff to answer 
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interrogatories and Requests for Production not fully 
responded to in Plaintiff's October 3, 1988 responses. (R-! 
pp. 2.12-242) 
No responses to Defendant's [lotion to Compel being 
received by the Court, the Court granted Defendant's Second 
Motion to Compel Discovery on or about December 7, 1988. (R-I. 
pp. 243, 247) 
On or about December 14, 1988, Defendant filed her Answer 
to Plaintiff's Interrogatories. The documents attached to 
Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories were 
referred to extensively in 1 he tiial of this matter. (R~fl 
PP. J-16) 
On or about December 16, 1988, Plaintiff filed his 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendant's Second Motion to Compel Discovery- (R-II pp. L9-
23) 
Plaintiff provided some additional information at that 
time. (R-1I pp. 62-85) 
On or about December 27, or more than two months after 
the trial date had been set, Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Continuance of the January 17, 1989 trial date. (R-II pp. 92-
95) 
On or about January 3, 1989, the Court issued its Order 
for Default upon Defendant's request, in that Plaintiff had 
failed to respond to Defendant's Second Motion to Compel 
Discovery on or before Decern!or 23, 1988, as ordered by the 
Court on or about December 15, 1988. Plaintiff's Answer and 
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Countp i-Petition were ordeied to be stricken and the CJptk wan 
ordered to enter Plaintiff's Default on the Petition to Modify 
the Decree of Divoice. (R-JJ pp. 97-104) 
Depositions W ^ T O lipid on or about January 4, 1989. 
On 01 about January r? , lC|8n, Defendant filed an Object inn 
to Plaintiff's Motion Loi Continuance of Trial. (R IJ p. 
L0r)) Defendant reminded the "ourt of Plaintiff's numpiou^ 
del ays. 
No Order continuing tl\p trial was ever entered by the 
Court. However, in a telephone confeience with thp Clark's 
Offjre, the Clerk indicated that the Court had denied 
Plaintiff's Motion to Continue thp tiial and that thp ti Lai 
was still scheduled for Januaty 17r 1989. 
On January 17, 1989, Defendant appeared in person, and 
with counsel and necessary witnesses for the trial. 
Plaintiff's counsel, Richard H. Johnson was present and 
indicated that Plaintiff was not available bpcausp he left thp 
country for vacation in South Ameiica. After discussion with 
counsel in the Judge's chambPLS, the trial was continued to 
February 28, 1989. (R-l p. 246) Defendant's counsel, though 
not on the record, objected to the continuance indicating to 
the Court that the continuance would be prejudicial to 
Defendant unless the Court made its Order retroactive to the 
date of the filing of Defendant's Petition to Modify. 
Trial on the Petition to Modify was lipid on Fpbiuary 28r 
1989, before the Honorable Judge VeNoy Chiistoffersen. 
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The Court's Memorandum Decision was issued on or about 
March 3, 1989, granting Dofendant's Petit J o n to Modify and 
i n c r e a s i n g o 11 i1d s uppo r t f ro m $ 30 0.0 0 pe r m o r 1t h p e r c h i 1 d t < > 
$700.00 per month per child, increasing alimony from $200.00 
per month to $500.00 per month and awarding $3,000.00 attorney 
fees. Defendant had offered testimony of her need for 
attorney's fees and ability to pay and had requested $4,000.00 
in attorney's fees. (R-II pp. 138-141) 
Notice of Withdrawal of counsel was filed by Plaintiff's 
attorney, Richard B. Johnson, on or about March 30, 1989. 
(R-II p. 142) 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of haw and an Order and 
Judgment on the Petition to Modify were filed with the Court 
on or about Harch 30, 1989, and signed by the Court on or 
about April 7, 1989. (R-II }>. 145-154) 
Notice of Entry of Judgment was issued on or about April 
19, 1989 (R-II p. 155) 
Notice of Appeal was issued by Lyle W. Hillyard, 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN, attorneys for Plaintiff, on or 
about May 4, 1989. (R-II p. 1.57) 
The Court of Appeals Issued its decision August 31, 1990, 
remanding the case for more adequate findings of fact and 
reversing the trial court's award of attorney fees. The Court 
of Appeals did not award costs or fees on appeal. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The Court issued a Memorandum Decision granting 
Defendant's Petition to Modify the Decree and awarding child 
7 
support for two children at $/00.00 per month per child and 
alimony at $500.00 per month. The Court had earlier, dining 
the trial, denied Defendant's petition to require Plaintiff to 
pay approximately $4,000.00 for costs incurred related to the 
home awarded to Defendant in the original divorce. That order 
is not appealed. 
T h e Cou rt o r d e r e d t h a t the m o d i f i c a t i o n of chi1d s u \ i po r t 
and alimony be effective as of January 17, 1989, the date 
first scheduled for trial of the Petition to Modify. 
Defendant was also awarded $3,000.00 as attorney's fees 
and costs. 
DISPOSITION AT COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court 
to enter more adequate findings or to take additional 
evidence, as may be needed on the issues of child support and 
alimony. 
The Court of Appeals also vacated the trial court's order 
on attorney's fees with no costs or fees awarded on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce on 
March 28, 1986. 
2. Immediately prior to the trial, or through Novpmber 
of 1985, Defendant was employed at Integrated Systems 
Engineering, Inc., a company originally founded by Plaintiff 
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and two other individuals, and subsequently sold. (TT p. 1J9, 
1. 16 - p. 21f 1. 10) 
3. Brent Brown's gross income from wages, salaries, and 
interest in 1985, the year jura prior to the divorce, exceeded 
$147,000.00. (TT p. 22, 1. 20 - p. 23, 1. 2) (See also page 
1 of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. I in Addendum 5.) 
4. During the Court's bench ruling in the original 
divorce, the Court indicatd that due to Plaintiff's apparent 
ability to earn a substantia.! income, and his testimony that 
he was not now employed, it \MS necessary to impute an income 
figure in order to establish fhild support. The Court 
arbitrarily chose a figure of $54,000.00 per annum and 
established child support at $300.00 per month per child for 
three children. (TT p. 3, 1. 22, to p. 4, 1. 11) (Ssee also 
copy of Reporter's Transcript of Court's Bench Ruling, R-II 
pp. 127-134) The Court then reviewed its concerns with both 
counsel regarding establishing alimony. The Court stateds 
. . . the NELSON I think is the latest one out 
— recites all of those factors you talk about 
on alimony and the purpose of it, and it is to 
maintain as close as you can the same standard of 
living after divorce as before the divorce with 
factors of needs on one hand and ability to pay 
on the other. 
The ability at the present time to pay, of 
course, is not there, but I assume it will be in 
the future, and the court can, of course, on any 
change of circumstances, as you know, take that 
into account; but I will award alimony that can be 
changed on any change in the situtation of income 
and I'll award $200.00 a month alimony. That's, 
as you understand, where there's a substantial 
change in circumstances this can be brought back 
if you can't agree on what that then should be. 
And certainly it would be a substantial change of 
9 
circumstances to go from zero income to, say, 
$60,000.00 a year or $25,000.00 maybe. (TT p. 4, 
L. 13 to p. 5, 1. 4.) (See also R-TI p. 129 1. 22 
- p. 130 1. 13. ) 
5. Pursuant to Plaintiff's 1986 Federal Income Tax 
Return, Plaintiff's income from wages, salaries, interest, 
dividends, and severence pay, in J986 was $51,350.00. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) (See also page 1 of Plaintiff's Ex. 2 
in Addendum 5) 
6. Plaintiff's 1987 Federal Income Tax Return indicated 
income from wages, salaries, interest, dividends, and rents in 
excess of $140,000.00. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) (See also 
page 2 of Plaintiff's Ex. 3 in Addendum 5) 
7. Plaintiff's personal financial statement to Zions 
First National Bank dated September 15, 1988, approximately 
five months prior to trial, indicated Plaintiff's income to be 
$130,000.00 per year with total liabilities of $56,000.00 and 
total net worth of $1,157,000.00. (Defendant's Exhibit 3) 
(See also in Addendum 5) 
8. Plaintiff's net worth at or about the time of the 
divorce was approximately $430,000.00. (computed from 
Findings of Fact, R~I pp. 47-48) 
9. Defendant's income for the three years in question 
was as follows: 
YEAR INCOME 
1986 $26,406.00 
1987 $28,734.00 
1988 $21,785.00 
(See R-II, p. 7 Also Addendum 6) 
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10. Defendant's expenses for the tliree years in question 
were as follows* 
YRAR EXPENSES 
1986 $29 , 3Rri . 00 
1987 $28,523.00 
1988 $25,500.00 
(See R-II, p. 7-8. Also Addendum 6) 
11. Defendant's net income after expenses for the three 
years in question was: 
YEAR NET INCOME 
1986 $- 2,979.00 
1987 211.00 
1988 - 3,715.00 
(See R-II, p. 7. Also Addendum 6) 
12. Defendant's net worth as of the date of trial is 
approximately $431,368.00 (See R-II, p. 13. Also Addendum 6) 
13. Brent Brown purchased Integrated Systems Engineering 
("ISE") in or about November of 1986. The sale was completely 
voluntary. (R-II pp. 25-85) 
14. ISE is wholly owned by Brent Brown. (TT p. 26, 
1. 9-10) 
15. The total equity of ISE on or about January 31, 
1988, was approximately $1,032,000.00. (Defendant's Ex. 2, 
Addendum 5) 
16. Defendant's attorney's fees were approximately 
$4,000.00, incurred mostly because of Plaintiff's refusal to 
cooperate in the action. 
17. Defendant's only assets are her home, furniture, 
automobile, and investments necessary to produce a small 
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amount of income. Any reduction in income producing assets 
also reduces the income avaJL'jle to Defendant. 
18. Defendant's income from all sources, including child 
support and alimony, does not even cover her living expenses, 
which Defendant has had to maintain at a very modest level. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Court of Appeals' decision vacating the tilal 
court's awatd of attorney fees and failing to award attoiney 
fees on appeal is in conflict with tin* decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court and other panels of the Court of Appeals. 
Rather than leaving the decision regarding attorney fees lo 
the sound discretion of the trial court based on need and 
ability of each party, the disposition at trial and the 
conduct of the parties, the panel has ruled that Defendant ran 
only be awarded attorney fees if she has no ability whatsoever 
to cover the costs of litigation. Basically, Defendant must 
be indigent to be awarded attorney fees. Furthermore, the 
Panel's decision has completely departed from the accepted 
cource of judicial proceeding in the issue of awarding 
attorney Eees in a divorce action, which has always treated 
attorney fees as a marital debt to be divided based on need 
and ability of each party to pay. The Panel also failed to 
follow its own guidelines in ''oiling to detail the facts upon 
which the Panel reversed its decision. The Panel only stated, 
"In light of Appellee's significant assets . . . " What assets 
is the Panel referring to? 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDE!) THE ISSUE 
OF ATTORNEY FEES CONTRARY TO ITS OWN 
FINDINGS AND CONTRARY TO THIS COURTS 
PREVIOUS DECISIONS. 
The Supreme Court of Utah, the Court of Appeals, and, to 
the knowledge of Defendant's attorney, the First District 
Court, have all been consistent in awarding attorney's fees in 
divorce actions. Attorney's fees are awardable in the trial 
court's discretion based upon the need of the requesting 
party, the reasonableness of the fees requested and the 
necessity of the fees. The question in this action Is what 
constitutes "need" on the part of the Defendant and who should 
determine that need, the trial court who heard a full day's 
evidence or the Court of Appeals based on an inanimate 
record? 
The panel in this action lias determined that Defendant 
has significant assets and is therefore not in need of 
assistance to cover her attorney's fees. The panel neglected, 
however, to specify what "significant assets" the panel is 
referring to, contrary to its own decision requiring the trial 
court to formulate specific findings to support its decision. 
We, therefore, have no idea what significant assets the panel 
is referring to. The panel further indicates that in order to 
be awarded attorney's fees, Defendant, "in essence, . . . muni, 
show that she would be 'unable to cover the costs of 
litigation.'" Basically, the panel is requiring Defendant to 
J3 
be i n d i g e n t t o be awarded a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , v/hich i s a b s o l u t e l y 
contrary to prior orders of this Court and other decisions in 
the Court of Appeals. 
In HUCK v. HUCK, 734 P.2d 417, (Utah 1986) this Court 
reaffirmed the standard for awarding attorney's fees, and 
stated t 
In divorce cases, an awawl of attorney's fees must 
be supported by evidence that it Is reasonable in 
amount and reasonably needed by the party requesting 
the award. BEALS v. BEALS, G82 P.?d 862 (Utah 
1984). Plaintiff contends that there is no evidence 
to support a finding of financial need on the part 
of defendant to justify the award of fees to 
defendant. He presented evidence that her total 
income from all sources including support payments 
totaled $1,795.00 per month and that therefore she 
should be capable of bearing the costs of litigation. 
However, defendant had no liquid assets and even 
using plaintiff's figures as to her gross income 
from all sources, her income barely covered her 
expenses. Her attorney testified at trial as to the 
reasonableness of the time spent and fees charged. 
The trial court awarded her less than one-third of 
the amount she sought. She met her burden of showing 
financial need and provided evidence that the fees 
awarded to the plaintiff ($2,750) were reasonable. 
In the instant action, the uncontroverted evidence 
clearly indicates that Defendant's current living expenses 
greatly exceed her current income. In 1988 alone, her 
expenses exceeded her income by more than $3,700.00, or more 
than the attorney's fees awarded by the trial court. Even 
with the child support and alimony award as modified and 
ordered by the trial court, Defendant's income is 
substantially lower than Plaintiff's income. 
Although Defendant has some assets which could be 
liquidated to pay her attorney's feps, any liquidation of 
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assets also impacts negatively on her income. Defendant's 
only assets are her home, furniture, automobile, and her 
income producing investments. The uncontroverted testimony at 
trial was that Defendant's net worth had diminished sinro tho 
time of the divorce while Plaintiff's net worth had almost 
tripled, to nearly $1,200,000.00. 
At trial, Defendant's counsel submitted an Affidavit of 
all attorney's fees which was accepted by Plaintiff and 
stipulated to by Plaintiff as being jeasonable. Defendant's 
attorney testified as to the ieasonableuess of the fees, I ho 
amount, and the necessity of the fees, and the need for time 
spent on the case. Although Plaintiff had no questions 
regarding the testimony of Defendant's attorney, Plaintiff's 
counsel did indicate that he did not believe that Defendant 
had established sufficient factors to merit an award of 
attorney's fees. The exchange between the parties was as 
follows: 
Mr, Johnson: 1 don't have any questions. Except 
that under the case law, counsel has not established a 
foundation for [an] award of attorney's fees. We would 
object to the Affidavit on that basis. 
• • • 
The Court? Where is the foundation lacking? 
Mr. Johnson! He has to establish need on behalf of his 
client. You know he's got to have testimony relative to 
what's reasonable. Just the standard guidelines out, of 
the latest case. 
The Court? Yes, he testified himself, I assume that 
Mr. Johnsons My client then testifies relative to 
attorney's fees. 
The Courts She testified as to a need. 
15 
Mr. Johnson: Then I didn't hear that. 
The Court: 1 did. 
Mr. Johnson: J just missed jt. 
(TT p. 134 125- p. 135 121) 
The trial court specifically held that Defendant had 
e s t a b l i s h e d a need f o r a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . Judge C h r i s t n f f ^ r s e n 
in his Memorandum Decision slated: 
Defendant is also asking attorney's f^es for this. 
Section 30-30-3 of the 0.C.A. has been 
interpreted to include actions for modification. 
Sep KALLAS v. KAT.LAS, 614 P.?d 641. Plaintiff's 
ability to pay attorney' «•? Tees is obviously much 
gieater than that of Defendant, Defendant only 
having income that she ieaJizes from investment of 
funds she received from the divorce plus her child 
suppoit and alimony. Defendant's counsel testified 
as to the hours and necessity of the amount of 
hours for the purpose of this hearing and the 
reasonableness of his hourly fee with a figure of 
around $4,000.00 attorney's fees. Flowever, in 
checking over this exhibit showing the amount of 
time spent, mainly concerning the cost of the curb 
and gutter. The Court feels there were some items 
which were not necessary and therefore reduced the 
attorney's foes award to 31,000.00 opposed to 
$4,000.00, plus costs. (n.L). p.4) 
Prior decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals 
are very consistent that attorney's fees are awarciable at the 
discretion of the trial court based on need and 
reasonableness. For example: 
In SINCLAIR v. SINCLAIR, 718 P.?d 396 (Utah 1986), this 
court stated* 
The award of attorney's fees was proper wheie H I P 
record showed defendant's need based upon the tact 
that her monthly expenses exceeded her monthly 
income and the attorney testified as to the reason-
ableness of his fees. 718 P.2d at 398 
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In OSGUTHORPE v. OSGUTHORPE, 791 P.2d 895 (Utah App 
J 990), the Utah Court of Appeals statedi 
Defendant claims plaintiff has sufficient means to 
pay her attorney fees incurred on appeal in liqht 
of the court's findings that plaintiff is capable 
of finding good, gainful employment, the award of 
alimony and child support, and th<* property distri-
bution. However, the trial court found that 
plaintiff did not have the ability to pay her 
attorney fees incurred at trial and that defendant 
should pay a portion of plaintiff's attorney fees. 
Because those findings are supported by the evidence 
we award plaintiff her costs and reasonable attorney 
fees incurred on appeal and remand to the trial court 
for determination of rearonable attorney fees 
plaintiff has incurred on appeal. 791 P. 2d 89(5 
Jn MUNNS v. MUNNS, 790 P.2d I1G (Utah App J 990), the 
Court of Appeals declined to award attorney's fees, agaiti 
defering to the court's discretion, the court stated: 
Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to award her attorney's fees. 
She states that she should have been awarded 
attorney fees because the record is repleat with 
evidence that she is in dire need of financial 
assistance, having no income other than alimony and 
child support and no liquid assets or marketable 
skills, while respondent has a steady job and 
liquid assets. On the other hand, respondent 
alleges that appellant did not demonstrate need 
because her property is virtually debt-free and she 
would be receiving a $9,000.00 judgment over the 
space of two years from which she could pay the 
attorney fees. 
To recover attorney fees in a divorce action, the 
moving party must show evidence (1) establishing 
the financial need of the requesting party, and (?) 
demonstrating the reasonableness of the amount of 
the award. (citations ommitted] Where either of 
these two factors have not. been shown, we have 
reversed awards of attorney fees. [citations 
ommitted] 
The parties both succeeded in establishing their 
respective financial need, and the attorney 
piesented evidence demons t rat ing t lie teasonableness 
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It, has fuither been the common practicp of the current 
judges in the First District, the Honorable Gordon J. Low and 
the Honorable F. L. Gunnel 1, to tieat both parties attorney 
fees in a divorce action essentially as marital debts and to 
award attorney fees based on a review and percentage of each 
parly's income in order to establish need. To assist counsel 
in reviewing the issue of attorney fees in order to settle 
divorce actions, the First District Judges have indicated that 
they, based on the evidence and needs of each specific action, 
will generally compare the income of the potential paying 
party, less support and alimony, to the income of the proposed 
receiving party, including child support and alimony, and to 
allocate total attorney fees incurred based on the percentage 
difference of the parties' adjusted income. 
Neither the trial court, the prior decisions of th^ Utah 
Supreme Court, nor the Utah Court of Appeals require one party 
to show that he or she is tot,ally without means to pay 
attorney's fees to be entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees . 
In the instant action, the trial court, in exercising Its 
discretion after hearing considerable testimony and dealing 
with numerous other issues in this case prior to the hearing, 
awaided Defendant $3,000.00 in attorney's fees based on the 
fact that her expenses greatly exceeded her income, that 
Plaintiff's income greatly exceeded Defendant's income, and 
that Defendant should not be required to liquidate assets to 
pay the attorney fees. The Court of Appeals can only vacate 
the award of attorney fees if there are no facts to support 
the trial court's decision. THROCKMORTON v. THROCKMORTON, 76/ 
P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988). The Court of Appeals' decision is 
not only contrary to prior case law on attorney fees, but, is 
inappropriate in failing to follow the proper standard of 
review on appeal, 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Christoffersen properly determined that Defendant 
was in need of assistance in paying her attorney fees. The 
Court of Appeals, however, without specifically indicating 
what assets were available, ruled that Defendant could only be 
awarded attorney fees if she were indigent. Defendant is 
certainly unable to cover the costs of the litigation and the 
Panel's decision is incorrect and inconsistent with prior case 
law and the usual course of judicial pioceecllngs. 
Defendant respectfully requests this Court to grant this 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to consider the correctness of 
the Court of Appeal's decision regarding attorney foes, both 
at trial and on appeal. 
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DATED this day of September, 1990. 
Jewell ^\ 
Cor Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
1 hereby certjfy that on t he 
3q90, t mailed a true and correct copy 
day of September, 
f tlip foregoing 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the following persons, 
postage pre-paid thereon, by depositing the same in the United 
States Hail. 
Lyle W. Hillyard 
HtLLYARD, ANDERSON fc 01.SEN 
175 East 100 North 
Logan, UT 84321 
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TAB 1. Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals dated 
August 31, 1990. 
C \ i I 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS niifv'ol <oO0 
ouOoo yUjXfJlf 
BrenL W. Brown, 
Plaintiff and Appellant/ 
v. 
Geraldine K. Drown, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 890293-CA 
First District, Cache County 
The Honorable VeNoy Christofferson 
Attorneys Lyle W. Hillyard, Logan, for Appellant 
Stephen W. Jewell, Logan, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Davidson, and Orme. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Appellant Brent W. Brown appeals an order that modified 
his decree of divorce by increasing the amount of alimony and 
child support payments he is to pay to appellee. Appellant 
claims that the trial court abused its discretion in increasing 
alimony and child support payments when (1) the appellee failed 
to meet her burden of showing a substantial change in 
circumstances necessitating the increase/(2) the appellee 
produced no evidence of a necessity for the increases or of her 
inability to aid in her own and the children's support, and (3) 
the trial court made no findings regarding necessity and 
ability. 
It 
findings 
are "clear, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
is reversible error if a trial court fails 
on all material issues unless the facts in 
uncontroverted, 
to make 
the record 
arc1 capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment." Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 
233, 236 (Utah L983). These findings "should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps bvr which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issup 
was reached." AcJLQ njy_._ DeJLiran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utali 1987) 
(quoting Rucker v. Dal ton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)).. 
The trial court's findings in the present case do not include 
sufficient detail for us to determine what steps it took in 
reaching its conclusions as to the material issues that must be 
considered prior to modifying a divorce decree. In fact, the 
findings are so sparse we do not know if the material issues 
were even considered. 
"The threshold requirement for relief [in a petition to 
modify a divorce decree] is a showing of a substantial change 
of circumstances occurring since the entry of the decree and 
not contemplated in the decree itself." Naylor v. Navlor, 700 
P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985)- In the present case, the trial 
court failed to make any specific findings on appellant's 
ability to pay, which is the alleged substantial change in 
circumstances. In particular, the trial court's determination 
that appellant's income was somewhere within a very broad range 
was insufficient to establish appellant's income—a critical 
factor in determining the larger question of his ability to 
pay. Because we do not know the factual basis for the trial 
court's conclusion that a substantial change in circumstances 
had occurred, we cannot determine whether appellee met her 
burden of proving this threshold requirement. Nor can we 
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in so 
finding, 
In awarding alimony, the trial court must consider eacli 
of the following three factors: "(1) the financial conditions 
and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the 
receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him o'r 
herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to 
provide support." Throckmorton v. Throcknorton, 767 P.2d 121, 
124 (Utah Ct. App. 198C) . In the present case the trial court 
failed to make specific findings concernirg any of these 
factors. In particular, the trial court made no findings as to 
appellee's ability to work. S&g, e.qf, Higlev v. Hicrley, 676 
P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983). The record is also "void of any 
facts as to [appellant's] or [appellee's] monthly expenses 
which are relevant both to [appellee's] 'reed' and 
[appellant's] ability to pay," TJbX9X?iU30ftrJ;Qin, 767 P. 2d at 125. 
Again, we are unable to determine whether the trial court's 
order increasing alimony was within its discretion because we 
do not know upon what factual basis it rests. 
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In determining child support the trial court must 
consider the following factors enumerated in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7(2) (1987): 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of 
others. 
Failure to consider these statutory factors is an abuse of 
discretion. Durfee v. Durfee, 140 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 43-44 
(Ct. App. 1990). The trial court in the present case has not 
indicated that it considered any of these statutory factors. 
We are therefore precluded from reviewing the merits of its 
award. 
The trial court failed to make adequate factual findings 
concerning the substantial change in circumstances and the 
other material factors identified above. Inasmuch as the 
record is not clear and uncontroverted and capable of only 
supporting the trial court's award of increased alimony and 
child support, we vacate the trial court's order and remand for 
further proceedings to take additional evidence on these 
factors, as needed, and for entry of findings concerning each 
factor identified above and any other material factor which may 
arise. While we do not approve or disapprove of the amounts 
awarded by the trial court, we do caution that M[w]e do not 
intend our remand to be merely an exercise in bolstering and 
supporting the conclusion already reached." Allred v. Allred, 
141 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
ATTOPSEY FEES 
Appellee was awarded attorney fees by the trial court 
based on the difference in earning ability of the parties. 
Appellant argues that this was an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion in that appellee failed to prove that she was in 
financial need. 
Before a trial court may award attorney fees in a divorce 
matter, the requesting party must show that award of attorney 
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fees is "reasonably needed by the party requesting the award." 
Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986). In essence, 
appellee must show that she would be "unable to cover the costs 
of litigation." Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980). 
The trial court, however, erroneously concluded that 
attorney fees were warranted because "[p]laintiff's ability to 
pay attorney fees is obviously much greater than that of 
defendant." 
In support of the trial court*s conclusion, appellee 
cites Andersenv. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 480 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) for the proposition that disparity between the parties1 
abilities to pay is a sufficient ground upon which to find 
need. We note, however, that in Andersen the "plaintiff 
testified that she had iifl means with which to pay her fees." 
Id,, at 480 (emphasis added). Appellee, on the other hand, has 
significant means with which to pay her fees. ££. Huck, 734 
P.2d at 420 (granting of attorney fees when party had no 
"liquid assets"). 
In light of appellee's significant assets, we find that 
she failed to meet her burden of proof that she reasonably 
needed the award. We therefore vacate the trial court's award 
of attorney fees. No cost or fees awarded on appeal. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
r X<*M-^r_~i. S
 4'4«**S***+m~ 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Gregor^K.Orme, Judge 
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TAB 2. Memorandum Decision of Trial Court dated 
March 3, 1989. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated 
April 7, 1989 
Order and Judgment dated April 7, 1989. 
IN TUt: FIRST JUDtCLAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHK 
STATU OF UTAH 
BRENT "W" BROWN, ) 
,..,.,_ , MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff ) 
v. 
) Civil No, 24569 
GERALDLNE K. BROWN, 
) 
Defendant 
) 
The parties were divorced in March of 1986. The Plaintiff 
prior to divorce was a partner in a company called Interyrated 
Systems Engineering which he Later sold and was taken on as an 
employee by the purchaser. Testimony indicated that the year 
prior to the divorce when he was in this situation his income 
was $100,000.00+ annually. At the time of the divorce, his income 
was zero having terminated any employment. At that time, based 
on the prior track record of the plaintiff, indicated that he was 
not going to remain at zero income and indicated that he had the 
ability to generate income. 
The Court estimiated an income of at least historically of 
$54,000,00 minimum. An alimony order of $200.00 per month was 
granted based upon that projection and $300.00 per month per child 
support for tluee children. It was estimated that he would soon be 
making cigain substantial monies was correct and was a conservative 
estimate because the evidence shows that the year after his divorce 
he purchased Intergrated Systems Engineering himself and his own 
personal financial statement submitted to a bank in Septembpr, 
Brown v. Brown 
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1988 he declares now a net worth of $1,157,000.00 and an annual 
income of $130,000.00 per year. 
The defendant has filed a Petition based on this change of 
circumstances for an increase in child support and alimony. 
Defendant has submitted as Exhibit 4, a financial statement updated 
from the September 19 8 8 Financial Statement he submitted to the 
bank in which he declares his monthly income of $10,000.00 per montl* 
as only $6,000.00. The Court recognizes that financial statements 
submitted to banks for purposes of loans are probably inflated and 
that financial statements submitted to the Court in divorce actions 
are probably deflated, and the figure is somewhere inbetween. 
The Court finds that in any event that there is a substantial 
change of circumstances in the defendant's income and it does not 
appear simply to be coincidental that his income the year before his 
divorce was in the $100,000,004- category annually and no income at 
the time of divorce and then two years later his income is in the 
$130,000.00 range at le^st so reflected on the statements submitted 
to the bank last September. 
The Plaintiff testified that there was several reasons for the 
decrease in his projected earnings in September, 19 88 and his now 
present financial declaration. Mainly being the type of business 
he has and the necessity of liquidation of assets and the necessity 
of decreasi'vlg his own income monthly because of the business 
problems. lie eliminated his bonuses, and has liquidated his stocks 
wherein he had formerly received interest and dividend income. If 
Brown v. Brown 
Civil No. 24569 
Page Three 
this was because of the Petition for Modification was filed of cours 
is not known and the Court will not assume that to be the case. 
However, the Court feels his present financial declaration which 
is liis Exhibit; 4, is more conservative than his actual income. 
The Court feels that the $130,000.00 on his financial statement of 
September 1988 which is deferent's Exhibit 3 is probably inflated. 
The Court will depart from the established guidelines because 
of the factor of the debt structure that was testified to by the 
plaintiff in his business that he now solely owns but will use the 
$72,000.00 September figure deducting therefrom the bonus commissior 
and dividend income and arrive at a figure of $700.00 per month per 
child as the modified order on child support payments. The Court 
feels this is equitable taking into account the debt structure of 
Integrated Systems Engineering from where he received his income. 
As factors on alimony you have to take into account his increased 
ability to provide the standard of living -that is now compatable with 
his income taking into account those factors listed in the English 
case, the Jones case, and the Nelson case, taking into account 
to try to maintain as close as you can the same standard of living 
at this time as was available before and an ability at the present 
time to pay and the needs of the defendant. The Court will therefor 
increase the aiimony award to $500.00 per month. 
Defendant is also asking attorney's fees for this. Section 
30-3-3 oC the U.C.A. has been interpreted to include actions Tor 
Blown v. Blown 
Civil Mo. 2 4 569 
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Modification. Sec Kallas v. Kalias, 614 P. 2nd 641. Plaintiff's 
abiJity to pay attorney's fees is obviously much greater than 
that of the defendant, the defendant only having the income that 
she realizes from investment of funds she received from the divorci 
plus her child support and alimony. Defendant's counsel testified 
as to the hours and the necessity of the amount of hours for 
purpose of his hearing and the reasonablenes5 of his hour]y fee 
and with the figure of around $4,000,00 attorney's fees. However 
in checking over his Exhibit showing the amcunt of time spent, 
namely concerning the cost of the curb or gutter. The Court feels 
there are some items that were not necessar' and has therefore 
reduced the attorney's fees award to $3,000,00 as opposed to 
$4,000.00 plus costs. 
Counsel for defendant to prepare the appropriate modi fication 
order. 
Dated this Jj gay of March, 1989. 
Q 
Stephen W. Jewell, 3814 
Attorney at Law 
15 South Mainr Third Floor 
First Security Bank Building 
Loci an, Utah 84321 
Telephone i < 801) 7D3-2UUO 
JN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT "W* BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
GERALDINFJ K. BROWN, 
Defendants 
Civil No. 24569 
This matter came on hearing before the Court, the 
Honorable VeMoy Chi~istoffex-sen presiding, on January 17, 1983 
and again on February 20, 1989- Defendant was present and 
represented by counsel, Stephen W- Jewell- Plaintiff was 
present only on February 28, 1989, and represented by counsel 
on January 17, 1989, and February 28, 1989- The Court having 
heard the evidence and testimonies presented r^ui the argument! 
of counsel, and being fully advised In the premises, now finds 
and concludes as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1* The parties were divorced on or about March 18, 
1986. 
2- Prior to the divorcer Plaintiff was a partner in a 
company called INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, which he later 
Bold and war, taken on QJB an ^mplayerer by the purchaser. 
3* Prior- to the divorce. Plaintiff *s income vas in 
excess ol $1U0, OOu\ Uth 
4* At the time o_f the clivcace, Plaintill's income was 
?p/nf havifjg terminated any employment. 
5. At the I i J».e of the divoreer based on Plaint! ft 's 
nbilaty to yeneiate income, the COUJ t estimated an income lor 
Plnintill oi at least historically &54,OOO-OO minimum. An 
nliinony aider of &20th Oil pex mant)i was granted based an that 
pi ojection and £HOO» OO per month .lor child support Xor three 
(3) children was ordered*. 
€». T)ie year following the divorce,, ax- in or about 
December 1986, Plaintill puichased INTEGRATED SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING himself and ciwiently is the sole owner ol 
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING. 
7* Plaintiff's net worth as ol September 1988, was 
approximately £1, 157. OOth CICh 
8. Although Plaintill represented on a financial 
statement to Zion's First National Bank dated September 15, 
1988, that his annual income was $130,00th0Q per year. 
Plaintiff testified at trial that his annual income was 
actually only $72,OOCLOO^ The court recognizes that financial 
statements submitted to banks for purposes of loans are 
probably inflated and that financial statements submitted to 
the Court in divorce actions are probably deflated and that 
Plaintiff's Income is somewhere in between those tvo figures* 
The court, however, declines to establish an exact income 
figure* 
2 
SL It does not appear* simply to be coincidental that 
Plaintili's income the year- belore his divorce was in the 
s.tOOr OCiO.OO plus range annually and no income at the Lime of 
the divorce,, and then tvo yearrs later his income is again in 
the $130,000.00 range, or at least so reflected on the 
statement submitted to the bank in September of 1988. 
10. The Court linds that in any event there is a 
substantial and material change of circumstances in thai 
Defendant's income has increased substantially Irow the time 
of the divorcer s«iiicie/it to -warrant, a modification erf the 
decree mid to grant Defendant's Petition* 
11. The child support as previously ordered oi S200.00 
pe* month p&r child shal.i be modified and increased so that 
Plaintiff shall pay £700* 00 p^x- month p^rr- child for child 
support payments. 
12. Although the Court is not specifically following 
the established child support guidelines, the Court feels this 
is equitable taking into account the debt structure of 
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING from y»h^x^ Plaintiff receives 
his income. 
13. After taking into account as factors on alimony,. 
Plaintiff's increased ability to provide the standard of 
living that is now compatible with his income, taking into 
account those facto* s li£i--"d in the ENGLISH case, the JONES 
case, and the NELSON case, and taking into account the Court's 
attempt to maintain as close as possible the same stanclnrd of 
living at this time as was available at the time oi the 
divorce and an ability at the present time for Plaintiff to 
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provide support, the r*&&c\& of Defendant, and the ability of 
Defendant to provide Yx&r own support, the Court will, 
Ujexelorer modify th*. Decree and increase the alimony award 
from S200- GO p&r month to SSOO* (JO p&x month* 
14. The Court finds that the £4*000*00 paid by 
Defendant for curb and gutter assessments are the obligation 
oJ the Defendant as the owner of the home and are not the 
obligation of Plaintiff* 
15* Defendant's counsel testified regarding attorney's 
feesr showing the time spent, the hourly rate charged,, and the 
necessity of the number of hours spent in light of the 
difficulty of the case. Jt was stipulated by counsel fox the 
Plaintiff that the rate charged was a reasonable one and was 
commonly charged fax such actions in the community* The Court 
finds, that Plaintiff's ability to pay attorney's fc&B is 
obviously much greater than that of Defendant* Defendant only 
having the income that Bit^ realizes from investment of lundB 
she received from the divorce plus her child support and 
alimony* However, in checking over the exhibit provided by 
Defendant's counsel showing the amount of time spent* the 
court f&&lB that there are some items that were not necessary; 
namely, concerning the costs of curb and gutter* the Court* 
therefore* finds that a reasonable award of attorney's 1GT(?B to 
Defendant from Plaintiff is S3*GOO*OOr plus costs* 
16* There having been no evidence regarding Plaintiff's 
Counterpetition* and a Motion to Dismiss the Counterpeti tion 
having been made by Defendant's counsel at the conclusion of 
Plaintiff's case and chief* and Plaintiff indicating his 
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intent, to withdraw bin: Coun lex petition,, the Court finds that 
the Courjterpet.it.icm ehould be dismissed, 
17. The Court incorporates herein by T-&jL&T&nc:.f? such 
other facts and findings as are stated in the Memorandum 
Decision dated March 3, 1989* 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There has h&&n a substantial and material change in 
circumstances in Plaintiff's income and ability to provide 
child support and alimony from the time of the decree,, and 
that said substantial and material change is sufficient to 
warrant a modification of the Decree of Divorce entered in 
this matter. 
2. In view ol the substantial and material change in 
circumstances,, the court concludes that l)Gr£&ndBnt*& Petition 
to Modify as to child support and alimony should be granted 
and that child support should be increased to $700* OO per 
month per child and that alimony should be increased to 
$-500.00 p&r month. 
3* The Court further concludes £4,000.. 00 paid hy 
Defendant for curb and gutter assessment is the obligation of 
Defendant as the owner of the prop&yrty and, therefore, the 
obligation erf the Defendant* Defendant's Petition as to said 
curb and gutter assessment should not be granted. 
4. In veiw of the c\xflBr&nc.& in earning ability and 
actual income received by both parties, Defendant has 
suli ic.ien t ly demonstrated the linancial n€r€>t\ lor* attorney's 
lees. The cou/ t concludes that £3,GOO*GO Is a reasonable 
amount lor attorney's IG'^EX and that the number ol hours spent 
were necessary in light ol the dilliculty ol the case, the 
rate charged lor attorney's lees vae reasonable as stipulated 
by opposing counsel and is commonly charged lor divorce 
actions in the community and that the award ol attorney's lees 
is based on the n^&d and results acbeived in the case* 
wu Plaintill's Count ex-petition should be dismissed. 
€>» The Order and Judgment entered in this matter shall 
be ellectlve as ol January 17r 1989* 
7» The Court incorporates herein by reference such 
other conclusions ol law as are stated in the Memorandum 
Decision dated March 3, 1989* 
DATED this J. clay ol Maireh*, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Vr., .v:' CHRIoTCiT^r.ScN 
VeHoy C h r i s t o f f e r s e n 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
G 
CERTIFICATE UF MAILING 
I hereby cextily Uiot on the _0[jj^ day of Marchr 1989, I 
mailed a true and correct copy o:f the loregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusioifis ui Lav and Notice to the foregoing 
pernoinEi, postage pre-paid theieonr by depositing in the United 
Stnt.pp. Maii» 
Richard B- Johnson 
Attorney at Law 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 3UO 
Clrem, UT 84G58 
Brent VL Brown 
1622 East lOttO North 
Logan, UT 84321 
Aj>U 
NUTICE 
Counsel lor Plaintiff is hereby notified that pursuant to 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
counsel has five (5) days to submit any objections to the 
Court* 
DATED thlE^T^T7; day of March, 198SL 
^S^2<^^Z. 
7 
Stephen W. Jewell, 3814 
Attorney lor- Defendant. 
15 South Main, Thir-d Floor 
First Security Bank Building 
Logan, Utah 843^1 
Telephone; (8CU > 753-2000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT "VT BROWN, « 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, * 
vo, * 
GERALDINE EC. BROWN, * 
Civil No. 24569 
Defendants *• 
Tlxis matter came on for hearing before the Court, the 
Honorable VeHoy Christoffereen presiding, on January 17, 1989, 
and again on February 28, 1989. Defendant was present and 
represented by counsel, Stephen W« Jewell, Plaintiff was 
present only on February 28, 1989, and represented by counsel 
on January 17, 1989, and February 28, 1989. The Court having 
heard the evidence and testimonies presented and the arguments 
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, and 
having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, now makes the following Order* and Judgment-
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1* The First Cause of Action and Second Cause of 
Action in Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, 
regarding child support and alimony respectively, shall be and 
are hereby granted-
ui* It I B ui dei ed that child support BJIBII increRBP 
/rein S3DO. GO to $700.GO per month per child. 
3. It IB hu Uier urdeiecl that alimony shall increase 
ixoin $200.00 to $500.00 pes month. 
4. Said mod 11 ted child evifijior t and alimony payments 
shall be paid elfective as oX January 17, 1989, and DeXendant 
is ip anted a judgment, against PlaintiXX lor all amounts owing 
Xi oift t.hat date to the date oX this order. 
5. The ThiDf d and Four th Cause© ol Action in 
Delendant's Petition to ModiXy Decree oX Divorce regarding 
road assessments and withholding oX child support and punitive 
damages shall be and are hereby denied. 
6. DeXendant shalI be and is hereby awarded a judgment 
against PIaintiXX as and for attorney's Xees in the amount oX 
S3,GOO.00. 
7. All other provisions oX the Decree entered 
previously xn this action shall remain as stated. 
8. PlaintiXX's Counter-Petition is denied and the same 
shall be and as he* eby dismissed. 
DATED this _ll day oX ttstosh, 1989. 
BY THE COURTl 
afoNO.Y. CHKurv. 
YeHoy ChristoXXersen 
District Judge 
7> 
CEKTIJMCAIE UF WAILING 
I he r e h y c e r t i f y t h a t on 1 h e ^ _?!_ flay o f M a r c h , 1^89, I 
m a i l e d a t r u e a n d c c a / e c t c o p y ojf t h e f o r e g o i n g O r d e r a n d 
J u d g m e n t a n d N o t i c e t o t h e X o r e q o i n q p e r s o n s , p o s t a g e p r e - p a i 
t h e r e o n , by d e p o r i t i n y .UJ t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s M a i l * 
R i c h a r d B. JuhriF.oii 
A t t r a r j p y a t haw 
1327 S c m t h *UK» Er*Fit, S u i t e 3CKI 
Ur&w, Ur 84US8 
Br e n t W- BJT o v n 
1B22 E a p t lOfUl N o r t h 
L o g a / J , 11 f 8 4 3 ^ 1 
NOTICE 
( u iuj t -e l IUJC P l a i u U f l I B h e r e b y n o t i f i e d t h a t , p m s u a n t t 
R u l e 4~^i04<2) al t h e U t a h C o d e o l J u d i c i a l A d m i n i s t x a t i o n , 
c o u i i f i e l h a c f i v e ( 5 ) d a y s t o Eiibwi t a n y o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e 
Lour t * 
DA'JED this _JJL- d»y ci Watch, 1989. 
/ > • / 
/ -
sT/ 
3 
